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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's perfunctory opinion in Samsung
Electronics Company v. Apple,' has left to the lower courts the
difficult task of fashioning a reliable test for the disgorgement of
profits under the design patent remedies provision.2 But Samsung has
also exposed the need for a broader conversation that reevaluates
whether the special remedies provision ought to be retained in its
current form, and what the objectives of the design patent remedies
provisions should be. This paper critically evaluates proposals that
attempt to implement the Court's Samsung ruling under the existing
provision, 3 while also seeking to provoke a conversation about
alternatives to that provision. 4
American patent law provides design patent owners with two
routes for recovering damages for design patent infringement. Section
289,' applicable only to design patents, provides that upon proving
infringement, design patent owners may seek an award of either $250
or the infringer's "total profit" on the "article of manufacture" with
which the infringing design is associated.6 Section 284, the general

1.

Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S.Ct. 429 (2016).

2.

35 U.S.C. § 289 (1952).

3. See, e.g., Sarah Burstein, The "Article of Manufacture" Today, 31 HARV. J.
L. & TECH. 782 (2018) [hereinafter Burstein, Today] (proposing a monolithic test for
the Section 289 article of manufacture); Perry Saidman et al., Determining the
"Article of Manufacture" Under 35 U.S.C. § 289, 99 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 349 (2017) (proposing a multi-factor test).
4. A scholarly debate over design patent remedies had started before Samsung
was decided. See JASON J. DU MONT & MARK D. JANIS, Design Patent Remedies,
AMERICAN DESIGN PATENT LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY (Cambridge Univ. Press.
forthcoming), http://ssm.com/abstract=2784746 [hereinafter Du MONT & JAMS,
Design Patent Remedies]; Mark A. Lemley, A Rational System of Design Patent
Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 219 (2014).

5. 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1952).
6.

See 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1952):
Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license

of the owner, (1) applies the patented design, or any colorable
imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of
sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to
which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be
liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than
$250, recoverable in any United States district court having
jurisdiction of the parties... Nothing in this Section shall prevent,
lessen, or impeach any other remedy which an owner of an
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utility patent damages provision, allows for an award of "damages
sufficient to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than
a reasonable royalty.",7 Courts have ruled that Section 284 damages
are available to design patent owners as an alternative to a Section 289
award.8
In Samsung, the Court ruled that the "article of manufacture"
in the Section 289 profits analysis as applied in any given case could
refer to the end product sold to a consumer or to a component of that
product, rejecting the Federal Circuit's interpretation that the article
always must be the infringer's entire product. 9 But the Court declined
to adopt a test for identifying the operative article of manufacture.
Moreover, because the Court was addressing only a Section 289
profits award, it did not speak to the extension of Section 284 theories
to design patents or to the $250 statutory damages element of Section
289.
The Court's terse opinion has left the lower courts with the
difficult task of articulating a reliable article-of-manufacture test for
infringed patent has under the provisions of this title, but he shall
not twice recover the profit made from the infringement.

7. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
8. Section 289 specifies that although "[n]othing in this Section shall prevent,
lessen, or impeach any other remedy which an owner of an infringed patent has
under the provisions of this title," design patent owners "shall not twice recover the
profit madefrom the infringement." Courts have construed this language to require
design patent owners to elect between a Section 284 and Section 289 award. See
e.g., Catalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2002) ("[A] patentee may not recover both infringer profits and additional damages
under § 284" for design patent infringement); Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 496 F. Supp. 476,496 (D. Minn. 1980) ("[T]he purpose of this latter phrase [in
Section 289] is to insure that a patentee not recover both the profit of an infringer
and some additional damage remedy from the same infringer, such as a reasonable
royalty."); Henry Hanger & Display Fixture Corp. of Am. v. Sel-o-Rak Corp., 270
F.2d 635, 643-44 (5th Cir. 1959) (concluding that Section 284 applies to design
patents, but where the infringer's profits are taken as the measure of loss under
Section 289, a royalty award cannot be added to the profits award); see also
Nordock, Inc. v. Sys., Inc., 803 F.3d 1344, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015), vacated, Sys., Inc.
v. Nordock, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 589 (2016) (observing that it would have been error to
instruct jury that it could simply circumvent the Section 289 calculation to reach the
Section 284 remedy). But cf Brief of the Bar Assoc. of New York at 2, Samsung
Elecs. Co., Ltd., 137 S.Ct. 429 (No. 15-777) (arguing that the plaintiffs recovery
of an infringer's profits under Section 289 does not preclude an award under Section
284). This argument places too much weight on the title of Section 289 ("additional
remedy") and relies too heavily on a distinction between "damages" and "profits"
that is not well-supported historically.
9. Samsung, 137 S.Ct. at 435-36.
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Section 289. If future courts applying such a test routinely award
minimal damages, then design patent owners will presumably explore
other avenues for damages, either by crafting theories under the
existing statute or by proposing legislative change. Accordingly, the
Samsung decision indirectly exerts pressure on the design patent
damages inquiry writ large, prompting questions about which
combination of remedies is best suited to provide adequate
compensation to design patent owners while still minimizing the risk
of windfall recoveries.
In Part I, this Article comments on the Supreme Court's
Samsung decision and its immediate aftermath. The Article goes on
to evaluate proposed tests for the Section 289 article of manufacture
and consider the possibility that the new jurisprudence of the Section
289 disgorgement remedy will drive design patent owners to consider
other approaches to design patent damages remedies.
The most obvious alternative is the existing regime of utility
patent remedies under Section 284. In Part II, this Article analyzes the
extension of Section 284 remedies to design patent matters. Part II
concludes that Section 284 lost profits damages may be difficult to
establish in many design patent cases, and that the reasonable royalty
theory is a poor fit for design patents. Moreover, the critiques aimed
at both theories in the utility patent context are equally significant for
design patents.
After assessing the Section 289 disgorgement remedy and the
Section 284 utility patent remedies, this Article turns in Part III to the
one remaining element of the existing statutory regime: the Section
289 statutory damages award, another special remedy available only
to design patent owners. This Article explores the law of statutory
damages as it has developed in copyright and trademark law and asks
whether there are lessons from those areas that might inform design
patent law. In particular, the Article examines how Congress might
revisit the Section 289 statutory damages remedy to make it a viable
remedy for design patent infringement without triggering the cascade
of difficulties that statutory damages have presented to date, especially
in copyright law. The Article considers whether design patent
infringement might be analogized to trademark counterfeiting, and, if
so, whether elements of the trademark anti-counterfeiting provisions
might be suitable for design patent law. Such an approach may have
merit, but only if suitable safeguards for retailers and consumers can
be put into place.
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THE DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS REMEDY AFTER SAMSUNG

In Samsung, the Supreme Court provided a two-step test for
obtaining a profits award under Section 289: "First, identify the
'article of manufacture' to which the infringed design has been
applied. Second, calculate the infringer's total profit made on that
article of manufacture."'10 Under this test, a unanimous Court reversed
the Federal Circuit's judgment in favor of Apple and remanded the
case. 11 Speaking for the Court, Justice Sotomayor reasoned that the
Federal Circuit erred in strictly applying the phrase "article of
manufacture" to the infringer's end product sold to consumers in all
cases.12 While the phrase could encompass the entire end product in
to "a component of that
any given case, it also could be restricted
13
product, whether sold separately or not."
But, the Court expressly declined "to lay out a test for the first
step of the § 289 damages inquiry."14 The Solicitor General suggested
a test in its amicus brief, but since the parties did not adequately brief
adopting a test was not necessary
the issue, the Court concluded that
15
to resolve the question presented.
Indeed, until its late stages, the dispute focused on the proper
construction of "total" in Section 289. Samsung argued that construing
it to apply to the entire profit made on a multi-component device
bearing the design would generate a windfall for the design patent
holder, while Apple argued that "total" was plain on its face and that
the legislative history signaled Congress's intention to reject an
apportionment rule. 1 6 Samsung also raised the article of manufacture

10. Samsung, 137 S.Ct. at 434.
11. Id. at436.
12. Id. at 435-36.
13. See id. at 435 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 171) (supporting this conclusion
with a textualist argument based in part on the fact that the phrase "article of
manufacture" appeared in other provisions of the Patent Act, where it had been
construed as not limited to end products; but, Section 101 relates to utility patents,
and Section 171, while it is a design patent provision, uses the phrase to refer to the
patentee's article of manufacture, not the infringer's).
14. Id. at 436.
15. Id.
16. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir.
2015). At the Federal Circuit, Samsung argued that Section 289 should be read
against the background principle that the infringement must cause the damages, and
that under such a reading, "total" could mean only the fraction of the infringer's
profits that was attributable to the infringement. Apple had argued that Samsung's
causation argument was merely apportionment in another guise.
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argument, but only in the alternative. 17 In an opinion rejecting both of
Samsung's arguments, the Federal Circuit had relatively little to say
about the contours of the article of manufacture, asserting that
ordinary consumers would regard the infringing smartphone product
as an integrated whole, and under those circumstances, subdividing it
for purposes of calculating profits was impermissible. 18 It was not
until oral argument at the Supreme Court that it became clear that
Samsung was giving up on its causation theory and pinning its hopes
19
on a restrictive construction of the article of manufacture phrase.
Consequently, it has now fallen to the lower courts to
determine how to carry out the now-critical article-of-manufacture
analysis. Some commentators have proposed one-shot tests, 20 while
others have advanced multi-factor tests that may invite a totality-ofthe-circumstances analysis. 21 The early cases suggest that courts will
gravitate to the multi-factor test suggested by the Solicitor General in
its amicus brief in Samsung,22 although the Federal Circuit had not
spoken on the issue as of the time of this writing.
For example, on remand in Samsung, Samsung argued for a
single-inquiry test, Apple argued for a multi-factor test, and Judge Koh
rejected both, instead adopting the Solicitor General's test. 23 Samsung
proposed that the relevant article be identified "by comparing the
claimed attributes of the design patent to the accused product to
identify the specific part, portion, or component of the product that
corresponds to the patent's claim. 24 Samsung's proposed test would
have excluded from the article "any part, portion, or component of a
product that is disclaimed by the patent or that does not correspond to
the claimed attributes of the patented design, including any part,
17. Id. at 1002.
18. Id. (citing Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros., 222 F. 902, 903 (2d Cir.
1915)) (distinguishing a single integrated product-a smartphone and its internal
hardware-from two separate, but complementary, products-a piano and a piano
case).
19. Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 434 n.2 (noting that Samsung had abandoned the
causation theory at oral argument).
20. See Burstein, Today, supra note 3.
21. See Saidman et al., supra note 3.
22. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at
27-29, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 137 S. Ct. 429, No. 15-777; Saidman, et al., supra
note 3.
23. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit remanded the case
to the trial court. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F. App'x 1012, 1014 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (unpublished).
24. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., 2017 WL 4776443 at *9 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 22, 2017) (quoting Samsung's Opening Brief at 3).
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portion, or component of' 25a product that is not considered when
determining infringement."
In Judge Koh's view, Samsung's test was unacceptable
because it was tantamount to a per se rule precluding any multicomponent product from constituting the relevant article.26 Curiously,
the court illustrated its concern by invoking a hypothetical involving
a design for a unitary product-namely, a design for the rim of a dinner
plate.27 The court reasoned that, in the dinner plate hypothetical, the
dinner plate itself "must be the relevant article of manufacture, even
where the design patent disclaims part of the [plate]. 28 According to
Judge Koh, if Samsung's proposed test failed to produce a logical
result when applied to a simple unitary product, it could not be relied
upon to produce a logical result for a complex multi-component
product, and must therefore be rejected.29 Judge Koh's reasoning
reflects a more fundamental concern: the patentee's claimed design
should not be dispositive of the article of manufacture inquiry because
it is the infringer's article that frames the Section 289 profits remedy
under the language of the provision.
These same concerns apply to other proposed single-inquiry
tests. Sarah Burstein has offered a test that likewise relies on "the
nature and scope of the claimed design" to frame the inquiry, 30 but is
even more extreme: it would exclude any "machine" or "composition
of matter" and would limit the article in any given case to "a tangible
item made by humans that has a unitary structure and is complete in
itself for use or for sale." 31 Recognizing that court might decline to go
25. Id.
26. See Apple Inc., 2017 WL 4776443 at *9-10. Judge Koh's critique of
Samsung's test would presumably extend to the test that Professor Burstein proposes
in her forthcoming article. See Burstein, Today, supra note 3 (proposing a monolithic
test for the Section 289 article of manufacture).
27. Id. at *10. The court's hypothetical supposed that the design patent at issue
used the practice of "partial" claiming, in which the design being claimed (the rim
of the plate) is illustrated in the patent drawings in solid lines, while other features
that are not being claimed as part of the design (the remainder of the plate) are shown
in dashed lines to help show the context in which the design appears. See Jason J.
Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Virtual Designs, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 107, 123-27
(2014) [hereinafter Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs] (providing examples of
partial claiming of GUI designs).
28. Apple Inc., 2017 WL 4776443 at *10.
29. Id.
30. Burstein, Today, supra note 3 (manuscript at 52).
31. See id. (manuscript at 61) Professor Burstein refers to her proposal as the
"historical" approach to the article of manufacture inquiry; id. (manuscript at 44, 62)
(claiming that the approach is "faithful to the real history and original intent behind
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so far as exclude machines per se, Professor Burstein suggests that the
"exterior housings or shells" be treated as the relevant articles because
they "[are] manufactured and could be sold separately." 32 This is a
reincarnation of apportionment that enshrines an assumption that
when an infringer appropriates a patented design without authorization
to the
and associates it with a product for sale, the infringer is enriched 33
same extent whether the product is a $50 item or a $3,000 item.
Unfortunately, proposed multi-factor tests may prove only
marginally more effective in providing a just remedy at reasonable
administrative cost. On remand in Samsung, Judge Koh adopted a
multi-factor test that had been proposed by the Solicitor General,3 4 and
the Act of 1887"). Professor Burstein has invoked a variety of historical sources in
support of her position, skillfully elaborated in Sarah Burstein, The "Article of
Manufacture" in 1887, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2018). Her extensive analysis
warrants a detailed response, which I must leave for another day. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to note that Professor Burstein's analysis places great
significance on some sources while neglecting to account for others and takes for
granted that because the term "manufacture" appears in a utility patent provision
regarding subject matter eligibility, it must necessarily mean the same thing when it
appears in a design patent provision regarding damages. This is one way to read the
historical record, but hardly the only way, much less the only plausible way. In any
event, as Professor Burstein correctly points out, proposals for interpreting Section
289 should be evaluated on their normative merits, not just their asserted historical
pedigree. See Burstein, Today, supra note 3 (declining to argue "that courts should
adopt the original meaning of 'article of manufacture' simply because it is the
original meaning").
32. Burstein, Today, supra note 3.
33. Saidman et al., at 358-59 (recognizing this same concem with inquiries that
purport to limit Section 289 profits to visible parts).
34. See Apple Inc., 2017 WL 4776443 at *8-11 (declining to adopt a slightly
different test that Apple had proposed). The Solicitor General's proposed test,
contrarily, called for consideration of the following factors: (1) how the defendant
sells its infringing product and accounts for its profits on those sales, including
whether the defendant typically sells its asserted article of manufacture as part of a
unified product or separately; (2) the visual contribution of the patented design to
the product as a whole, including whether the claimed design gives distinctive
appearance to the product as a whole or only to the asserted article of manufacture;
(3) the degree to which the asserted article of manufacture is physically and
conceptually distinct from the product as sold; and (4) The defendant's reasons for
appropriating the patented design, including whether the defendant did so in an effort
to replicate a product as a whole. A similar proposed test appears in Saidman et al.,
supra note 3, at 355:
the visual contribution made by the patented design to the overall
appearance of the end product sold by the infringer, in the eye of
an ordinary observer; whether at the time of the infringement, the
patentee or infringer separately sold its proffered articles of
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this test has been invoked in at least two other cases 35 and is preferred
among some commentators. 36 The Solicitor General's test identifies
the relevant article by way of a "case-specific examination of the
relationship among the design, any relevant components, and the
product as a whole" 37 to be conducted by the factfmder in view of the
totality of the circumstances. 38 Several factual considerations lie at the
heart of the proposed analysis: (1) "the scope of the design claimed in
the plaintiff s patent," 39 including an inquiry into the patent document
as a whole that places weight on the article of manufacture that the
plaintiff identifies as being associated with the claimed design; (2)
"the relative prominence of the design within the product as a
whole"; 40 (3) "whether the design is conceptually distinct from the
product as a whole"; 41 and (4) "the physical relationship between the
patented design and the rest of the product," especially where the
evidence shows that the design "adheres only to a component of the
product" or is "embodied in a component that is manufactured
42
separately from the rest of the product.,
Like the proposed single-inquiry tests, the Solicitor General's
test presents the danger that the patentee's claimed design will become
the focal point of the Section 289 profits calculation. While Judge
Koh in her remand opinion agreed that the scope of the claimed design
should not be dispositive, 43 she insisted that it be included explicitly

manufacture; the intent of the infringer in appropriating the
patented design; and the degree of difficulty in calculating total
profit of the proffered articles of manufacture.
35. Nordock, Inc. v. Systems, Inc., 2017 WL 5633114 at *4 (E.D. Wisc. Nov.
21, 2017); Jury Instructions at 15-16, Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc. v. Seirus
Innovative Accessories, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01781-HZ (S.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2017), ECF
No. 378.
36. Elizabeth M. Gil, Samsung v. Apple: Taking a Bite out of the Design Patent
"Article of Manufacture" Controversy, 25 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REv. 67 (2017); Rachel
Johns, Samsung v. Apple: A Proposalfor"Article ofManufacture,"2 GEO. L. TECH.
REv. 93, 99-100 (2017).
37. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at
27, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777).
38. Id. at 25-26. The proposal seems to assume that a determination has
already been made that the articles at issue are multi-component products, not
unitary products. But that distinction itself may be difficult to draw.
39. Id. at 27-28.
40. Id. at 28.
41. Id. at 28-29.
42. Id. at 29.
43. Apple Inc., 2017 WL 4776443 at * 12.
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as one of the factors.' But given the inherent flexibility of multifactor tests, there is ample room for the scope factor to stampede the
remaining factors.45 The Saidman et al. proposal recognizes this
problem and deals with it by proposing that the factfinder assess "the
visual contribution made by the patented design to the overall
appearance of the end product sold by the infringer, in the eye of an
ordinary observer."4 6 This formulation appropriately consigns the
patented design to a mere relevant "frame of reference" for the inquiry
and reduces the likelihood that the factf'mder will base Section 289
profits on "a simplistic one-to-one mapping of the patented design
47
This is
onto the infringer's asserted article of manufacture."
important because it should not be taken as a foregone conclusion that
the products sold by the infringer and the patentee will be identical, or
even similar. Design patent infringement might occur even if the
infringer appropriates the patented design for a product that is quite
acknowledged as
different from the patentee's product.48 Judge Koh
49
readily.
too
difficulty
this
aside
brushed
much but
In addition, the Solicitor General's test is problematic because
it tolerates too much complexity and uncertainty without achieving
5°
sufficient gains in equitable outcomes specific to the parties. Like

44. Id. at * 10 (rejecting Apple's proposed test because it purportedly omitted
the scope of the patented design altogether as a permissible consideration).
45. Moreover, an undue emphasis on the scope of the patentee's design will
also undoubtedly trigger strategic drafting practices aimed at turning the scope factor
to the patentee's advantage.
46. Saidman et al., supra note 3 at 355.
47. Id.
48. Consider, for example, a patented design for a sailboat figurine used as a
table decoration or for jewelry, asserted against a defendant who makes a sailboat.
49. The court conceded that the scope of the claimed design might be of little
significance if the infringer applies the patented design "in a way that differs from
the way that the plaintiff claimed the design in the patent," but deflected this concern
by indicating that this issue could be argued to the factfinder in a given case. Apple
Inc., 2017 WL 4776443 at * 12. On the other hand, Judge Koh also opined that "how
the [infringer's] product is sold can be considered by the factfinder in determining
the relevant article of manufacture." Id. at * 11. This may prove to be an important
counterweight to the emphasis on the patented design.
50. I offered some of these critiques in a co-authored amicus brief on behalf of
a group of intellectual property law professors. Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of
Intellectual Property Professors at 2, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S.
Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777). Cf Apple Inc., 2017 WL 4776443 at *12 n.4
(contending that the test is no worse than those for obviousness or the reasonable
royalty). The brief argued that the language of Section 289 precluded apportionment
and also foreclosed the construction of "article of manufacture" in a way that
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most open-ended multi-factor "totality of the circumstances" tests, this
test threatens to devolve into an ad hoc non-test driven by intuitive
judgments. 51 Even if it were confined to its explicitly enumerated
factors, the Solicitor General's test broaches too much uncertainty.
For example, factors three and four resemble the copyright law's
separability analysis applicable to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
aspects of the designs of useful articles, an exceptionally difficult test
to apply, as the Supreme Court's controversial Star Athletica decision
reflects.52
The Nordock decision may illustrate the difficulty. There, the
parties manufactured dock levelers, and an issue in the Section 289
analysis was whether the relevant article of manufacture was the entire
dock leveler or some subset of its components, such as the lip and the
hinge plate. 53 The court also noted that it was plausible to treat a
unitary product as conceptually separable into multiple components,
so that even if the lip and hinge plate were welded to the remainder of
the dock leveler and thus were not physically separable, it might still
54
be permissible to divide the leveler into components conceptually.
However, the court found the record to be incomplete in this regard
because it did not specify how the defendant manufactured its dock
55
levelers, even though it did indicate how the plaintiff had done so.
Indeed, the court suggested that "the manner in which the component
achieved the functional equivalent of apportionment. It asserted that remedies
reform might be needed, but that it was a matter for Congress.
51. Nordock's arguments in its case on remand illustrate the potential for this
to occur. Nordock asserted that the court should add thirteen additional factors to
the test. Nordock, Inc., 2017 WL 5633114 at *4-5 (reciting Nordock's proposed
additional factors but declining to adopt them). However, the answer is not to discard
the multi-factor test in favor of a single-inquiry analysis. In the proposed singleinquiry tests, the operative considerations are no less vague and complex. They are
simply buried within subtle distinctions between "manufacture" and "machine" and
the like, rather than being laid out explicitly as in a multi-factor test.
52. Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017)
(adopting an "imagination" test for determining whether pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features of a useful article may satisfy requirements for copyright
protection). I anticipate that courts will shy away from these factors, exacerbating
the problem of too much reliance on the scope of the patentee's design
53. Nordock, Inc., 2017 WL 5633114 at *7-8. The court noted that the design
patent drawings depicted two components of the dock leveler in solid lines (the lip
and hinge plate) but depicted the remainder of the dock leveler in dotted lines, a
drafting technique indicating that only the design of the components is considered
to be claimed.
54. Id. at *7.
55. Id.

252

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 37:3

was manufactured" by the infringer should be another factor added to
the Solicitor General's test. 56 At a minimum, this adds to the
complexity of the inquiry, but it also raises the specter of case-specific,
into any
potentially outcome-determinative factors being interjected
57
given case to aid the court in arriving at a remedy.
Finally, under the Solicitor General's test, there is very little
scope for post-verdict oversight by the trial or appellate courts. Courts
have adopted the Solicitor General's suggestion that the article of
manufacture inquiry be deemed a question of fact, 58 and this is surely
correct based on the nature of the inquiry and the law of damages more
generally. While it has been suggested that administration of the
article of manufacture inquiry would be improved simply by
designating the ultimate conclusion a question of law, experience with
inquiry in utility patent law strongly suggests
the claim construction
59
otherwise.

Reasonable minds may differ as to the respective merits of the
tests proposed to date for the article of manufacture inquiry. But it

56. Id.
57. Some proposals have suggested that the infringer's reasons for
appropriating the claimed design be taken into account as an additional factor in the
Section 289 profits analysis. See Apple Inc., 2017 WL 4776443 at *8 (Apple's
proposed test); Saidman et al., supra note 3 at 357 (asserting that the infringer's
intent should be taken into account in the Section 289 analysis because there is no
opportunity for a Section 289 award to be trebled in cases of willful infringement).
Judge Koh declined to include an intent factor in the test, expressing doubt that the
statute supported such a factor. Apple Inc., 2017 WL 4776443 at *10. Quite apart
from that concern, there is no doubt that including an intent factor would add to the
complexity of the inquiry.
58. Apple Inc., 2017 WL 4776443 at *10 (agreeing to designate the inquiry a
question of fact); Nordock, Inc., 2017 WL 5633114 at *7 (same).
59. Cf Burstein, Today, supra note 3 (citing Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (arguing that the article of manufacture
inquiry is "analogous to" the utility patent claim interpretation; and, that treating the
inquiry as a question of law would promote uniformity and encourage the early
resolution of disputes)). Two decades' worth of post-Markman claim interpretation
jurisprudence amply demonstrates that giving courts greater authority over a critical
inquiry does not guarantee that the goals of uniformity and efficiency will be met.
Moreover, even if the ultimate question as to the article of manufacture were
considered a question of law, it is likely that the analysis would still be largely driven
by underlying factual questions, and further litigation would be needed to elucidate
those questions precisely so that proper deference could be accorded on appeal. This
has occurred in claim interpretation, after a protracted and costly struggle. See Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (ruling that claim
interpretation can include subsidiary factual disputes, and findings on those
subsidiary fact matters are to be reviewed for clear error).
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seems undeniable that no simple or predictable test will be formulated
in the short term. In Nordock, the trial court acknowledged that "some
of the factors that are relevant in determining what is the article of
manufacture might be the same as those that lead to difficulties in
identifying the profits from a component," prompting Congress to
enact the total profits remedy now codified in Section 289.60 But,
according to the court, "if the obstacle is so great as to generally deny
patent holders the relief that Congress intended in enacting § 289, it is
up to Congress to amend the law." 61 Indeed, it is reasonable to expect
that design patent owners will turn their attention to other alternatives
while they await the arrival of some clarity and equilibrium in Section
289 analysis. I take up some alternatives next, considering how
damages theories under existing Section 284 doctrine apply to design
patents, and then turning to more remote alternatives borrowed from
outside of patent law.
II.

UTILITY PATENT REMEDIES FOR DESIGN PATENT
INFRINGEMENT

If courts adopt a Section 289 article of manufacture test that
regularly yields minimal damages, design patent holders may shift
their efforts toward developing damages theories under the utility
patent remedies provision, 35 U.S.C. § 284, and its extensive case
law.62 Compensatory damages under Section 284 in utility patent
cases have commonly taken the form of either the design patent
owner's lost profits on lost sales, or reasonable royalty damages, the
statutory floor for compensatory damages. 63 Some might regard a
future shift to Section 284 as positive, akin to a de facto repeal of
Section 289's disgorgement remedy. 64 However, there are reasons to
be skeptical that positioning Section 284 as the primary vehicle for
60. Nordock, Inc., 2017 WL 5633114 at *6.
61. Id.
62. Before the Samsung decision, one commentator argued that Congress
should repeal Section 289, leaving design patent owners to rely on Section 284.
Dennis M. White, Inefficiencies in Overcompensating Design Patent Damages
Under 35 U.S.C. § 289 in Complex Technologies, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 444, 458 (2013).
63. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(identifying patentee's lost profits and reasonable royalty damages as alternative
categories of compensation for infringement).
64. Presumably, some might advocate an actual repeal of that provision on the
ground that the risk of a windfall remains even after the Samsung decision, and that
Congress long ago eliminated the disgorgement of profits as a utility patent remedy.
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design patent infringement damages would strike a plausible balance
between the need to award reasonable compensation to prevailing
design patent holders and the need to minimize the risk of
disproportionate awards. In some respects, this debate takes us back
to the 1880s, when Congress was first presented with the argument
that design patent law needed a special remedies provision, as I
explore below.
A.

Design Patentee's Lost Profits: The Alternative
Designs Problem

In utility patent cases, lost-profits damages are appropriate
whenever there is a "reasonable probability that, 'but for' the
infringement, [the patentee] would have made the sales that were
made by the infringer." 65 But-for causation is assessed under the fourfactor Panduit test, which considers "(1) demand for the patented
product, (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing alternatives, (3)
[capacity] to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of profit [the
patentee] would have made." 66 Ordinarily, the lost profits
computation is based on the patented device. If that device includes
or is usually sold with unpatented components, then the patentee may
be permitted to include the unpatented components in the profits
calculation under the entire market value rule, but only if "the patented
feature creates the basis for customer demand or substantially creates
the value of the component parts."6 7 The entire market value rule
derives from the principle of apportionment.68
Design patent owners may face a puzzling problem when
attempting to establish entitlement to lost profits under this test. The
requirement to show the absence of acceptable non-infringing
substitutes, 69 which presents practical problems in many utility patent
65. Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1263-64 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc)).
66. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th
Cir. 1978).
67. Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1549-50 (entire market value rule); Uniloc
USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (customer
demand/creates-the-value condition).
68. AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782 F.3d 1324, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
69. Regarding the requirement to show demand for the patented product, courts
would presumably require a design patent holder to show merely that there was
demand for the article of manufacture with which the design is associated, rather
than requiring the patentee to show demand for the particular features of the claimed
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cases, may present a dilemma for patent owners in design patent
cases. Designs that are dictated by function cannot receive design
patent protection, and one of the chief metrics for demonstrating
functionality is to show that there are no alternative non-infringing
designs that achieve the same function as the claimed design. 71 While
that inquiry is not identical to the "acceptable non-infringing
substitutes" analysis used in the lost profits calculus, a design patent
owner's efforts to defend against functionality by showing the
existence of non-infringing alternative designs for carrying out the
same function may be in tension with its efforts to establish
entitlement to lost profits.72

design. See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (ruling that the first factor "does not require any allocation of
consumer demand among the various limitations recited in a patent claim," but rather
asks simply "whether demand existed for the 'patented product,' i.e., a product that
is 'covered by the patent in suit' or that 'directly competes with the infringing
device') (quoting Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1548-49).
70. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Products Co., 185 F.3d 1341,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing that "market sales of an acceptable noninfringing substitute often suffice alone to defeat a case for lost profits"); id. at 1350
(calling for "sound economic proof of the nature of the market and likely outcomes
with infringement out of the picture"). To show an absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, one must show that no acceptable non-infringing substitute
was either actually on the market or otherwise available at the time of the
infringement. Id. at 1349; see also Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. SaintGobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining
that a substitute that is not on sale but can be commercialized readily is available,
not absent, for purposes of the Panduit analysis).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2013) (requiring that designs be "ornamental," the
statutory basis for the functionality doctrine); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v.
Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (pointing out that evidence
of a lack of alternative designs for accomplishing a given function has often been
"an important-if not dispositive-factor in evaluating the legal functionality of a
claimed design"); Best Lock Corp. v Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (invalidating design patents on functionality grounds); see also JASON J. Du
MONT & MARK D. JANIS, Functionality in the U.S. Design Patent and Community
Design Systems, in HENNING HARTWIG, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DESIGN LAW
(forthcoming 2019) (summarizing the recent case law).
72. The functionality test is not identical to the non-infringing substitutes test
because the functionality tests asks only about the existence of substitutes. If
substitutes exist but are not readily available on the market, a design patent owner
might escape functionality and still conceivably be able to meet the test for showing
lost profits.
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The record of the infamous Carpet Cases73 provides a glimpse
into the difficulties of attempting to show that an infringer's activity
is the but-for cause of a patentee's lost profits in a design patent case.
Carpet manufacturers Doman, Hartford, and Bigelow each succeeded
in proving design patent infringement against a rival manufacturer, the
Dobson Brothers, in separate infringement actions that were
eventually consolidated into two cases (hereinafter the Dornan and
Hartford/Bigelow cases).74 The trial judges in both cases seemed to
be persuaded that the Dobsons had intentionally infringed, 75 and at
least some of the infringing articles allegedly were identical copies of
the patented designs. 76 Both judges appointed special masters to
recommend a remedy, and, over a period of several months, the special
from carpet
masters heard extensive testimony in the respective cases 77
parties.
the
from
salesmen, manufacturers, and executives
The applicable remedies provision for patent cases brought in
equity-authorized courts to award prevailing patentees both an
accounting of the infringer's profits made from the infringement, and
additional damages that the patentees may have suffered.78 However,
the Hartford/Bigelow design patent owners had expressly waived
claims to the disgorgement of the Dobsons' profits,79 and in the
Dornan case, Dobson had testified that he had sold the infringing
carpet at a loss. 80 Thus, the owners were limiting their claims to "the
suffered by the complainants by reason of the defendants'
damages ...
infringement., 81 The proofs were not framed in terms of the modem
73. Dobson v. Doman, 118 U.S. 10 (1886); Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co.,
114 U.S. 439 (1885) (consolidation of Case Nos. 231, 232, 233 involving design
patents owned by Hartford Carpet Co. and Bigelow Carpet Co.). For background,
see Du MoNT & JANIS, Design Patent Remedies, supra note 4, at 11-30.
74. Du MoNT & JANIS, Design PatentRemedies, supra note 4, at 14-16.
75. Bigelow Carpet Co. v. Dobson, 10 F. 385, 386 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1882).
76. See, e.g., Appellee Brief at 2, Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439
(1885) (No. 231) (alleging that infringing carpet at issue was a "complete counterfeit
of the patented carpet in every line, shade, and figure"); Appellee Brief at 1, Dobson
v. Doman, 118 U.S. 10 (1886) (No. 202) (characterizing the case as "an outrageous
case of piracy").
77. Du MONT & JANIS, Design PatentRemedies, supra note 4, at 14-23.
78. See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (specifying that the
patentee was entitled to recover "in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the
defendant, the damages the [patentee] has sustained thereby").
79. Transcript of Record at 34, Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439
(1885) (No. 231) (special master's report) [hereinafter HartfordRecord].
80. Id.
81. Id. It was ironic that the Carpet Cases dealt solely with an award of
patentees' lost profits, because the cases became the flashpoint for the Congressional
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Panduit test, but the patentees were attempting to show that the
infringement had caused them to lose sales (and thus lose profits); the
same general endeavor that would be undertaken in a lost profits claim
82
under Section 284 today.
The endeavor was doomed. There were surely dozens of noninfringing substitute patterns that consumers presumably might have
purchased had they been unable to purchase from the Dobsons.
Moreover, there was evidence of segmentation in the carpet market,
with the design patent owners generally selling only into the high-end
market, while the Dobsons pursued more cost-conscious consumers
that the patentees would never have serviced. 83 Under such market
circumstances, there seemed to be ample support for the Dobsons'
argument that it was "impossible" for design patent owners "to
satisfactorily prove any actual damages,"84 at least in the form of lost
profits. In the Hartford/Bigelow cases, the special master observed
that the patentee had offered "[m]uch testimony" to show that the
infringing carpets "must inevitably have lessened the sales" of the
patented carpets, but that the testimony as to the amount of the
decrease was "uncertain and conflicting," 85 leaving him "unable to
state what the decrease of the complainants' sales, due to the
infringement, amounted to ... ."86 The special master also took into
account the fact that carpet designs have "but a short and precarious"
commercial life, and the fact that the terms of the design patents at
issue were quite short-three and a half years. 87 All of this led the
master to conclude that the patentees had failed to prove entitlement
debate leading to the special design patent remedies provision in the 1887 Act, which
provided an award in the form of disgorgement of the defendant's profits.
82. The design patent owners in the Carpet Cases had one advantage that
modem design patent owners lack: at the time of the Carpet Cases, the functionality
requirement had not yet crystallized as a condition for patentability in design patent
law. See Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Functionality in Design Protection
Systems, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. 261, 264-66 (2012) (explaining the origins of the
doctrine).
83. Appellant's Brief at 26-27, Dobson v. Doman, 118 U.S. 10 (1886) (No.
202).
84. Appellant's Brief at 12-13, Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439
(1885) (No. 231).
85. HartfordRecord, supra note 79, at 16.
86. Id.
87. Accordingly, the special master declined to infer that the patentee's sales
of carpets in the first year would have been replicated in succeeding years until
patent expiration. Id. The special master also rejected the patentees' claims to be
compensated for the estimated cost of creating another design and resetting the
looms to make that design. Id.
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to lost profits. 88 It was a simple failure to show causation. According
to the Dobsons, the patentees had failed to prove "that the defendants'
sales displaced the plaintiffs' goods in the market," and that "they
could have supplied the demand, or that they would, or could, have
sold to defendants' customers a yard of the carpet which defendants
sold. '' 89 The master recommended a nominal damages award of six
90
cents.
While the trial judge in the Hartford/Bigelowcases rejected the
recommendation and awarded damages, 9 ' he did so only by assuming
away the causation issue, ruling that because the Dobsons had acted
willfully, he could presume that all sales made by the infringer would
have been made by the patentee at the profit that the patentee had made
during the first season in which the patented designs had been
introduced. 92 The special master in the Dornan case, perhaps learning
from the companion case, adopted this same approach and
recommended damages; 93 a recommendation duly accepted by the
Dornan trial judge. 94 Perhaps the Dobson saga illustrates the sheer
futility of asserting lost profits claims in design patent cases. Perhaps
it merely shows that it is unusual to prevail on a lost profits theory,
regardless of the context.

88. HartfordRecord, supra note 79, at 17.
89. Appellant's Brief at 19, Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439
(1885) (No. 231) (emphasis in original); see also Appellant's Brief at 27-28, Dobson
v. Doman, 118 U.S. 10 (1886) (No. 202) (pointing out that defendant sold several
other non-infringing patterns of the "same quality of carpet, during the same period
of time").
90. HartfordRecord, supra note 79, at 17.
91. Bigelow Carpet Co. v. Dobson, 10 F. 385, 386 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1882);
HartfordRecord, supra note 79, at 63-64.
92. Bigelow Carpet Co. v. Dobson, 10 F. at 387 (calculating the patentees' lost
profits based on the patentees' sales price and cost per yard during the first season,
multiplied by the number of yards that the defendant sold during subsequent
seasons).
93. Transcript of Record at 33-38 (Master's Report), Dobson v. Doman (No.
202), 118 U.S. 10 (1886). The special master also emphasized the popularity of the
Doman pattern, concluding that the demand for the patented design was so great that
it was "reasonable to suppose that the trade would have been compelled to obtain
the genuine design if the pirated article had not existed." Id. at 37. Moreover, the
special master was convinced that there was evidence of actual diversion of the
patentee's sales to the defendant, due to the fact that "a very large proportion" of the
infringing carpet "was sold to customers who had previously bought the genuine
carpet of the complainants." Id.
93. Id. at 87 (order dated Oct. 3, 1882).
94. Id.
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But even if in an unusual case a modem design patent owner
could satisfy the Panduittest, lost profits would still be subject to the
apportionment analysis. 95 Here the analysis circles back to a
fundamental point of disagreement in Samsung-whether
apportionment is essentially impossible for designs, given the fact that
the essence of design subject matter is the visual appearance brought
about by a combination of features taken collectively. The legislative
history of the 1887 Act suggests that the proponents of the special
remedies provision assumed that apportionment could not be carried
out for designs. 96 On the other hand, apportionment inquiries are
difficult in many utility patent contexts too, and techniques for
carrying them out continue to be proposed. 97 Whatever the outcome
of this debate, a lost profits theory is (and surely must be) a limitedpurpose remedy, and to the extent that it requires an apportionment
analysis, it probably offers no administrative costs savings as
compared with the post-Samsung article of manufacture analysis that
will be used for calculating profits disgorgement.
B.

ReasonableRoyalty Awards: A PoorFitfor Design
Patents?

For the design patent owners in the Carpet Cases, failing to
prove lost profits meant failing to receive any monetary recovery. The
1870 Act did not specify any minimum monetary award in cases at
law or equity, so a patentee who was unable to prove actual damages
customarily was awarded nominal damages (usually in the amount of
six cents). 98 Not until the early twentieth century did the Supreme
95. See, e.g., Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v.
Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (vacating damages award
where trial court failed to apportion lost profits in a utility patent case).
96. See S. REP. No. 49-206, at 1-2 (1886) (emphasis in original) ("The
Supreme Court [in Dobson] held that the complainant must clearly prove what part
of his own damage or what part of defendant's whole profit on the article made and
sold was directly due to the appearanceof those articles as distinguished from their
material, their fabric, their utility, etc.... It has been abundantly shown to your
committee, even if any such showing were necessary, that the proof thus called for
can never be furnished.") (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 49-1966, at 3 (1886) ("It
is expedient that the infringer's entire profit on the article should be recoverable, as
otherwise none of his profit can be recovered, for it is not apportionable .... ").
97. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Jeremy 0. Skog, Using ConjointAnalysis to
Apportion Patent Damages, 25 FED. CIR. B.J. 581 (2016) (providing an example of
one such technique).
98. 3 WILLIAM ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS §
1052 (1890).
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Court definitively endorse the concept of a calculating a "reasonable
royalty" as an estimate of actual damages, and not until 1922 did
Congress amend the statute to make such an award a mandatory
minimum.

99

A modern design patent owner theoretically would be in a
better position than the carpet design patentees given the availability
of reasonable royalty damages as a fallback position where a lost
profits allegation cannot be proven. 100 But there are a number of
reasons to doubt that reasonable royalty damages will emerge as a
practical alternative to the Section 289 disgorgement remedy in the
short term, or that reasonable royalty damages would be a good fit for
design patent infringement.
Although theoretically available to design patent owners for
many decades, reasonable royalty awards appear to have been
exceptionally rare in design patent cases to date. 101 The sheer allure
of Section 289 damages may not be the sole cause. For starters, the
core reasonable royalty inquiry, which calls for an ex-post analysis
probing the hypothetical license negotiation that a patentee and
infringer would have supposedly undertaken, may be even more of an
excursion into fantasy in design patent cases than in utility patent
cases. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, unlike many areas of utility
patenting, there is no active licensing market for design patents
"[g]iven the close connection between design patents and brand
identity."'1 0 2 Conceptually, a reasonable royalty analysis may be a
99. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648-50
(1915) (award in the form of a "reasonable royalty"); Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58,
§ 8, 42 Stat. 389, 392 (amendment requiring award of a "reasonable sum").
100. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (specifying damages "in no event less than a
reasonable royalty").
101. I have found only two reported decisions granting such an award. See
Kryptec Outdoor Grp., LLC v. Salt Armour, Inc., 2016 WL 7757267 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 28, 2016) (designated not for publication) (granting a reasonable royalty award
based on an established license involving a package of design patents and
copyrights); Krieger v. Colby, 106 F. Supp. 124, 129-30 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (holding
that the predecessor to Section 284 applies to design patents, and assessing
reasonable royalties by accepting the plaintiff's proffered royalty amount).
102. Brief of the Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Respondent at
9, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S.Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777). Some
amici took this position in Samsung, in response to arguments that interpreting
Section 289 to forbid apportionment would facilitate new opportunities for abusive
patent assertion entities. Id.; Brief for Bison Designs, LLC, et al., as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 33 n.44, No. 15-777, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777) (asserting that "unlike utility patent
licensing, design patent licensing rarely occurs" because design patent owners wish
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poor fit for most design patent cases, except perhaps for cases
involving combinations of design patents and other intellectual
103
property where licenses have been effected for the entire package.
Practical, doctrinal considerations may also point firmly in the
same direction. Even as applied in utility patent cases, the fifteenfactor Georgia-Pacificanalysis1" 4 has come under heavy fire as being
10 5

"ambiguous, unworkable, inherently contradictory, and circular."'

The Federal Circuit has displayed some weariness over the Georgia-

Pacific test, noting that although trial courts "often parrot all 15 factors
to the jury" the Federal Circuit has never described the GeorgiaPacific factors as a talisman for royalty rate calculations," ' 106 and does
"not require that witnesses use any or all of the Georgia' 10 7
Pacific factors when testifying about damages in patent cases."
It would surely be worse in design patent cases. Courts would
0 8
nor
ordinarily have no established royalty to use as a starting point,
10 9 A Georgiaany "comparable" license to use as a benchmark.

Pacific factors analysis applied to a design patent case might well be
more speculative than in a utility patent case with same (or greater)

problem of high administrative costs.
Alternative tests may not fare much better to the extent that
they retain the basic conceptual orientation of the hypothetical
to retain exclusivity over the "look" of the products that they market) [hereinafter
Bison Designs Amici Brief].
103. Kryptec Outdoor Grp., LLC, 2016 WL 7757267 at *4-5.
104. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
105. Stuart Graham et al., First Report of the Berkeley Center for Law &
Technology Patent Damages Workshop, at 1-2 (Aug. 15, 2016),
(citing
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/patentdamagesworkshop.pdf
extensive scholarly criticism).
106. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
107. WhitServe, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 31-32 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (proceeding to remark that if experts do choose to use the factors,
"reciting each factor and making a conclusory remark about its impact on the
damages calculation before moving on" is not of value).
108. See Georgia-PacificCorp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (setting forth the first
factor: "[t]he royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit,
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.").
109. On comparable licenses used in utility patent damages, see Jonathan
Masur, The Use and Misuse of PatentLicenses, 110 Nw. U. L. REv. 115 (2015). Of
course, the absence of any comparable license presents one benefit: eliminating the
risk of circularity between patent damages and licenses. See William Lee & A.
Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL
L. REv. 385, 417-19 (2016) (asserting that the analysis of comparable licenses
contributes to the "ex post contamination" of the damages analysis).
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negotiation. For example, the Federal Circuit Bar Association's 2016
Model Jury Instructions propose that juries could be instructed on a
list of considerations that, while much shorter than the GeorgiaPacific list, is still likely to be problematic for design patents because
it relies on evidence of comparable licenses (which are unlikely to
exist) and inquires into the "value" that the claimed invention
contributes to the accused product along with the value that other
10

factors contribute-essentially the apportionment analysis.
Moreover, as with the lost profits theory, a reasonable royalty
calculation requires an apportionment analysis. Apportionment has
always been a factor in the Georgia-Pacificanalysis, and recent
rhetoric in utility patent cases makes clear that apportionment is an
11
imperative for component claims in multi-component devices.
The few cases in which reasonable royalty theories have been
applied in design patent cases illustrated some of these difficulties. In
Bernhardt,'12 the court discussed these "inherent difficulties" in
measuring damages via a reasonable royalty in the design patent
dispute that it confronted. The "most relevant Georgia-Pacific
factors" were "of little help," the court complained: "any established
royalty (factor one) would not be a reasonable measurement;
Bernhardt would not license Collezione anyway (factor four); the
parties would never have a commercial relationship (factor five);
Collezione's use of the design has been in a different market niche
(factor eleven); the parties would never have agreed on any royalty
(factor fifteen)." 113
110.

Model PatentJury Instructions (Instruction 6.7), FEDERAL CIRCUiT BAR
(Jan. 2016), https://fedcirbar.org/IntegralSource/Model-Patent-JuryInstructions.
111. See Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
("[W]hen claims are drawn to an individual component of a multi-component
product, it is the exception, not the rule, that damages may be based upon the value
of the multi-component product."). According to the Federal Circuit, "[a] patentee
may assess damages based on the entire market value of the accused product only
where the patented feature creates the basis for customer demand or substantially
creates the value of the component parts." Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am.,
Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Federal Circuit has further
explained that "[tihese strict requirements limiting the entire market value exception
ensure that a reasonable royalty does not overreach and encompass components not
covered by the patent." Virnetx, 767 F.3d at 1327 (quoting LaserDynamics, Inc. v.
Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 70 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
112. Bernhardt L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 739,
741 (M.D.N.C. 2006).
113. Id. at n.3; see also Young v. Grand Rapids Refrig. Co., 268 F. 966, 974
(6th Cir. 1920) (asserting that the "absence of any other measure of recovery is one
AsSOCIATION

Symposium 2018]

DESIGN PA TENT

263

Experience with reasonable royalty awards in trademark law
reinforces the proposition that reasonable royalty damages should not
be cast in a leading role in design patent remedies. To be sure,
reasonable royalty awards in trademark infringement cases are not
unheard of, but they are highly unusual.' 14 Most courts recognize that
reasonable royalty awards are likely to be appropriate only in cases in
which there is a defimed licensing market for the trademark at issue
and an established royalty. For example, where a trademark license
forms a part of a franchise agreement and the franchisee continues to
use the mark after the franchise agreement has been terminated, some
courts have concluded that a reasonable royalty award might be
workable.115 But where there is no evidence that the mark owner was
willing to license the mark, attempting to calculate compensation in
the form of a reasonable royalty award makes little sense
normatively. 116 Moreover, when relying on a reasonable royalty
theory, courts in trademark cases have tended to use the Georgiaof the reasons for resorting to a reasonable royalty," and concluding that "the
considerations supporting that measure of damages apply with much lessened force,
if at all, to a design patent of this character," perhaps a reference to the fact that the
design patent was directed to a small component-a latch casing-of a multicomponent item-a refrigerator).
114. See Brief of the Int'l Trademark Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 3-4, Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Florida Entm't Mgmt., Inc., 135 S. Ct.
57 (2014) (No. 13-1271), cited in Rebecca Tushnet, What's the Harm of Trademark
Infringement?, 49 AKRON L. REv. 627, 629 n.4 (2016). In contrast to the Patent Act,
the Lanham Act does not expressly authorize reasonable royalty damages. See infra
note 124 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., La Quinta Corp. v. Heartland Props. LLC, 603 F.3d 327, 345
(6th Cir. 2010) (upholding a royalty-based award, along with enhancements and
attorney fees); Howard Johnson Co. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1519, 1520 (1lth
Cir. 1990) (upholding a royalty damage award on the basis that it is permissible to
use lost royalty payments to replicate actual damages suffered by a victim of
trademark misuse); see also RESTATEMENT (3D) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt.
d, at 382 (1995) (noting that a reasonable royalty allegation is typically made in
cases involving holdover licensees).
116. See Trovan Ltd. v. Pfizer, Inc., 2000 WL 709149, at *18 (C.D. Cal. May
24, 2000) (vacating a reasonable royalty award and commenting that due to the lack
of "any evidence that plaintiffs in this case would have licensed the rights to the
mark, the award of reasonable royalties has no basis in reality, much less any basis
in fact."). But cf Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 963
(7th Cir. 1992), remanded and aff'd, 34 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1994). Sands, a reverse
confusion case, appears to be the lone example of a case in which the court tolerated
a reasonable royalty award as one component of damages despite the absence of a
prior licensing relationship between the parties. However, there was arguably
evidence that the plaintiff had been willing to license the mark to a third party at
some point.
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Pacific factors as the starting point for the reasonable royalty
analysis,11 7 thus importing many of the administrative complexities
and substantive defects associated with reasonable royalty analysis in
18
utility patent cases. 1
III.

RECONSIDERING STATUTORY DAMAGES AS A REMEDY FOR

DESIGN PATENT INFRINGEMENT

I have argued that it is reasonable to expect that design patent
owners will seek alternatives to Section 289 profits awards postSamsung, at least in the short term, and that extending Section 284
awards to design patents may also prove to be problematic. In the
existing statutory regime, that leaves one other alternative: the Section
289 statutory damages award. I turn to that topic in this Part.
The legislative history of the special design patent remedies
provision suggests that Congress expected that the statutory damages
remedy to be no mere throwaway alternative. Congress sought to set
the amount high enough to "command for the design patent laws a
respect which is the patentee's greatest protection."11 9 It considered
the amount to be "the average amount that will work substantial justice
in the long run, taking into account all trades and industries that are
likely to avail themselves of the design patent laws."' 2 ° A string of
early cases seems to bear out the prediction that the statutory damages
award was commercially significant. Indeed, statutory damages
awards seem to have become rather routine in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, although the sample of reported cases is very
small. 121
117. See, e.g., David Drews, Determining an Appropriate Royalty Rate for
Reasonable Royalty Trademark Damages, 49 LES NOUVELLES 150 (2014)

(suggesting modifications to the Georgia Pacific analysis to adapt it to trademark
cases).

118.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. d (Am. Law

Inst. 1995) (invoking standard criticisms: the award may "provide little disincentive
against infringement" because an infringer is not worse off than any other licensee,
and "in some cases the royalty measure may also fail to account for the absence of
other benefits and burdens present in an actual licensing relationship."). But see
Kevin Bendix, Copyright Damages:IncorporatingReasonableRoyalty from Patent

Law, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 527 (2012) (proposing a test that adapts the Georgia
Pacific factors for copyright cases).
119. H.R. REP. No. 49-1966, at 3 (1886).
120. Id.
121. See Western Gas Fixture Co. v. Jefferson Glass Co., 296 F. 128, 129 (4th
Cir. 1924) (concluding that the lower court erred in awarding $7.32 in infringer's
profits and declining to award $250); Frank v. Geiger, 121 F. 126, 126-27
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Today, however, the statutory damages remedy in Section 289
is a virtual dead letter. A $250 award-the amount unchanged since
its enactment in 1887 122-hardly can be taken seriously in the context
of modem design patent litigation. Consequently, we have no modem
design patent jurisprudence of statutory damages, and, of course,
123
American utility patent law has no experience with the remedy.
Thus, I look to trademark and copyright law for examples of statutory
damages regimes. I then offer a few principles for developing a new
statutory damages regime in design patent law, a regime that is
informed by trademark and copyright experience.
A.

Statutory Damages Under Trademarkand Copyright
Law
1.

Lanham Act Statutory Damages

The Lanham Act has assigned a comparatively limited, but still
important, role for statutory damages in trademark matters. 124 In a
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903) (awarding $250 for one instance of knowing infringement by
exposing a design for sale); Ripley v. Elson Glass Co., 49 F. 927, 930 (C.C.S.D. Oh.
1892) (remarking that the infringement was "so deliberate and intentional" as to
warrant the award of $250 as prayed for, plus an injunction and an account); Pirkl v.
Smith, 42 F. 410, 411 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1890) (awarding $250, as the patentee had
requested); Redway v. Ohio Stove Co., 38 F. 582, 584 (C.C.S.D. Oh. 1889)
(decreeing an injunction and an award under the 1887 Act "for the sum of $250, and
for an account. .. ").
122. The amount appears to have been one of several elements of the 1887 Act
that were copied from British legislation. See Du MONT & JANIS, supra note 4 at 32
(pointing out that the British legislation authorized statutory awards of up to fifty
pounds sterling, which would have been roughly equivalent to $250 U.S. at the
relevant time).
123. Community Design law does not illuminate this endeavor. The
Community Design Regulation leaves damages determinations to national tribunals,
applying the law of the country of infringement. See DAvID C. MUSKER,
COMMUNITY
DESIGN LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE
2-567 (2002);
Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 Dec. 2001 on Community Designs, art.
89; see also E-mail communication with Alexander Klett, Partner, Reed Smith LLP
(Jan. 30, 2017) (on file with author) (specifying the types of damages awards
available when the country of infringement is Germany).
124. The Lanham Act damages provisions have long been a target for scholarly
critique, although the criticisms generally have concerned issues other than statutory
damages. See Mark A. Thurmon, Confusion Codified: Why Trademark Remedies
Make No Sense, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245 (2010) (critiquing the refusal to permit
punitive damages, the bad faith requirement for an accounting of profits, and the
approach to awarding attorney's fees, among others).
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routine civil action to enforce trademark rights under Lanham Act
Sections 32 or 43(a), statutory damages are not available. 125 The
Lanham Act instead provides that a prevailing trademark holder may
recover the defendant's profits and any damages sustained, 126 and the
27
court may enhance the amount by up to three times actual damages. 1
In 1984, Congress introduced additional remedies applicable
in counterfeiting cases where the defendant knew that the goods
bearing a registered trademark were counterfeit and intended to offer
them for sale. In such circumstances, the court was to treble the actual
damages or profits and charge the defendant with the mark owner's
attorney's fees. 128 But the damages provision did not include an
option for electing statutory damages. This omission prompted
criticism,

129

and, eventually, a legislative proposal that became law in

1996.130 The Senate Report accompanying the bill recognized the
concern that "a civil litigant may not be able to prove actual damages
if a sophisticated, large-scale counterfeiter has hidden or destroyed
information about his counterfeiting,"' 13 1 and that "counterfeiters'

records are frequently nonexistent, inadequate or deceptively kept in
order to willfully deflate the level of counterfeiting activity actually
engaged in." 132 The Report invoked what seem to be a mixture of

125. Statutory damages are available for domain name infringements under
Section 43(d). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012); Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi,
673 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2012).
126. 15U.S.C. § 1117(a)(2008).
127. Id.

128. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). Because the anti-counterfeiting legislation applied
only to registered rights, and product design trade dress was not routinely registered
at the time, Congress may have given little thought to any unique challenges posed
by applying the anti-counterfeiting provisions to product design. S.REP. No. 98-526,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 11 (1984) (stating that "the bill does not extend to imitations
of features of trade dress or packaging-such as color, shape and the like-unless
those features have been registered as trademarks [on] the principal register... and
are in use.").
129. See, e.g., J. Joseph Bainton, Reflections on the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act of 1984: Score a Few for the Good Guys, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 26 (1992)
(recommending an amendment to incorporate statutory damages); see also
Thurmon, supra note 124, at 318 (suggesting that the idea of adopting a statutory
damages option for all trademark matters warrants further study).
130. Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104153, 110 Stat. 1386, § 7 (July 2, 1996).
131. S. REP. No. 104-177, at 10(1996).
132. Id.
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punitive 33 and compensatory motivations 134 for enacting statutory
damages.
Accordingly, in an action involving "the use of a counterfeit
mark [as defined elsewhere in the Lanham Act] in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services," the mark
owner may elect an award of statutory damages in lieu of profits and
actual damages. 135 Permissible statutory damages range from $1,000
to $200,000,136 or, in cases of willful use of the counterfeit mark, up
to $2 million, 137 in both instances measured "per counterfeit mark per
type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed, as the
13 8
court considers just.'
Courts have awarded statutory damages under these provision
in a number of cases,1 39 frequently concluding that the counterfeiting
at issue has been willful, and sometimes awarding the statutory
maximum in those cases. Consequently, some such awards have been
quite substantial. 140 At least one court has also extended statutory
damages to a contributory counterfeiter. 14 1 In practice, courts have
said that they set statutory damages awards at amounts designed "to
1 42
compensate plaintiffs, as well as to deter and punish defendants,"'
133. See id. ("Enabling trademark owners to elect statutory damages is both
necessary and appropriate in light of the deception routinely practiced by
counterfeiters.").
134. See id. ("The [statutory damages] amounts are appropriate given the
extent of damage done to business goodwill by infringement of trademarks."); see
also Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 110 (2d Cir. 2012)
(emphasizing the compensatory rationale, remarking that "Congress apparently
sought to ensure that plaintiffs would receive more than de minimis compensation
for the injury caused by counterfeiting").
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c).
136. Id. at § 1117(c)(1).
137. Id. at § 111 7(c)(2); see also Prioritizing Resources and Organization for
Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (October 13,
2008) (increasing the maximum allowable statutory damages under § 1117(c)(2)
from $1 million to $2 million).
138. Id. at §§ 1117(c)(1), (2).
139. Antonio R. Sarabia, Marked Recovery, L.A. LAW. 36 (Apr. 28, 2005).
140. See, e.g., Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Ultimate One Dist. Corp., 176 F.
Supp. 3d 137, 170 (E.D. N.Y. 2016) (awarding $10 million total in statutory
damages).
141. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Akanoc Sol'ns, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 94445 (9th Cir. 2011) (ruling that because § 1117(c) refers to cases "involving" the use
of a counterfeit mark, there can be liability for facilitating unauthorized uses by
others).
142. Chanel, Inc. v. Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d 678, 687 (D.N.J.2015) (citations
omitted).
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but that because statutory damages are an alternative to actual
"bear some [discernible]
damages, the statutory damages should
' 143
relation to the actual damages suffered."
2.

Statutory Damages Under the Copyright Act

In contrast to trademark law, where statutory damages are
available only in cases involving counterfeiting, the Copyright Act
permits a copyright owner in any case to elect between an award of
(1) actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer; or (2)
statutory damages, 44 assuming that registration requirements are
satisfied. 45 The statutory damages provision authorizes courts to
award "not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers
just.' ' 146 However, an award outside of that range is permissible in a
number of circumstances specified in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). Where
the infringement is willful, the court "in its discretion may increase the
147
award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000."
Where the infringement is innocent, the court "in its discretion may
reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than
$200. " 148 The provision also requires the court to remit statutory
damages in cases where specified individuals or entities "believed and
had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the
copyrighted work was a fair use.... "149
Congress did not include statutory damages in the proposed
design protection provisions that would have become Title II of the
1976 Copyright Act, although the proposal did contain language
requiring that the damages award not be "less than the reasonable
value" assessed by the court.' 50 The damages provision applicable to
143.
144.

Id. (citations omitted).
17 U.S.C. §§ 504(a)(1)-(2), (c)(1).

145.
146.
147.

17 U.S.C. § 412.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
Id. at § 504(c)(2).

148. Id. The statute specifies that the infringer must prove, and the court must
find, that the infringer "was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her
acts constituted an infringement of copyright." Id.

149. Id.
150.

According to the proposed language:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award him damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than the reasonable value the court shall assess them. In either
event the court may increase the damages to such amount, not
exceeding $ 5,000 or $ 1 per copy, whichever is greater, as to the
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the vessel hull protection scheme 15 1 adopts a modification of this
approach, eliminating the minimum award amount but retaining a cap
on enhanced damages. 152
The statutory damages remedy in copyright has been subjected
to withering criticism, especially in recent decades, as explored in
more detail below. A chief question for discussion here is whether
those criticisms are largely specific to the application of statutory
damages in copyright or whether they go to qualities inherent in the
very concept of statutory damages. My answer, reflected in the
analysis below, is mixed.
B.

Statutory Damages in Design PatentLaw: Some
LimitingPrinciples

In the Samsung litigation, some design patent owners argued
that the total profits remedy under Section 289 played a crucial
deterrent function. They alluded to cases in which design patent
owners (some operating small businesses) faced widespread copying
of their patented designs, sometimes at the behest of major retailers
who may have been operating with intentional disregard for the
relevant design patent rights.' 53 As portrayed by the design patent
court shall appear to be just. The damages awarded in any of the
above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a
penalty. The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the
determination of damages.
S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-47 (1975) (proposed § 222(a)),
http://www.ipmall.info/sites/default/files/hosted-resources/lipa/copyrights/SenateR
eportCopyrightActl 976.pdf.
151. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1332.
152. The relevant language provides that:
[u]pon a finding for the claimant in an action for infringement
under this chapter, the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement. In addition, the court
may increase the damages to such amount, not exceeding $50,000
or $1 per copy, whichever is greater, as the court determines to be
just. The damages awarded shall constitute compensation and not
a penalty. The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the
determination of damages.
17 U.S.C. § 1323(a). The provision also offers, as an alternative, an award of the
infringer's profits "resulting from the sale of the copies if the court finds that the
infringer's sales are reasonably related to the use of the claimant's design." Id. at §
1323(b).
153. Bison Designs Brief, supra note 102, at 24-29.
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owners, it was the threat of total profits disgorgement under Section
289 that brought the alleged infringers to the negotiating table and
facilitated settlement.
The story elaborated here might be labelled a story of design
patent counterfeiting. 154 And that label may have significance beyond
its rhetorical force, given that counterfeiting is a term of art in other
settings (such as trademark) that yields access to special remedies,
including statutory damages. If there is a plausible case to be made
that at least some design patent infringement cases can be fairly
conceptualized as instances of design patent counterfeiting, and that
design patent remedies provisions should offer specific deterrence
against instances of design patent counterfeiting, it is also plausible to
ask whether a statutory damages remedy could be crafted that would
serve this purpose. That is especially the case if the Section 289
disgorgement remedy, and the Section 284 remedies as they are
currently understood, prove to be unlikely to offer specific deterrence
in any reasonable measure.
On the other hand, statutory damages provisions have a
remarkably troubled history, particularly in copyright law. Thus, the
overriding consideration in examining a statutory damages provision
for design patent infringement should be to determine whether it is
possible to calibrate such a provision closely to tie it to compensatory
and deterrent objectives. Hence, my focus in the analysis below is
largely on limiting principles.
1.

Compensation and Deterrence Objectives

The utility patent law's damages provision specifies that
damages are to be awarded in an amount that is "adequate to
compensate for the infringement,"' 155 and courts have routinely
invoked this compensatory objective. 156 The provision separately
specifies that the court may treble the damages, and modem courts
have characterized these enhanced damages as punitive, limited to
57
cases in which willful infringement can be shown. 1

154. See id. at 29 (using the term "counterfeiters").
155. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
156. See, e.g., Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (reasoning that adding a "Panduitkicker" to a reasonable royalty award to
account for litigation expenses was an abuse of discretion because it departed from
the compensatory nature of the award).
157. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (2016).
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The existing special design patent damages provision is not a
punitive measure. The Federal Circuit has refused to authorize lower
courts to treble Section 289 awards. 15' The legislative history suggests
that the statutory damages provision was envisioned to provide
with the threat of
minimum compensation, and, when coupled
159
effect.
deterrent
potential
some
disgorgement,
A modem statutory damages provision for design patent
infringement should define a permissible range of statutory damages,
where the range is defined to reflect the objectives of (1) roughly
approximating the compensatory damages that the design patent
owner would have received; and (2) providing a modest deterrent
against future infringements, especially by the same party.160 It should
be understood that a "modest deterrent" does not authorize the use of
statutory damages to achieve punitive aims. Any statutory damages
award under this regime should not approximate a trebled actual
damages award.
Even if it were designed with these limited objectives in mind,
a resuscitated statutory damages provision for design patents would
hardly be worth discussing if its principal effect (real or perceived) is
to facilitate troll behavior, or to open up new market opportunities for
In the Samsung briefing, proponents of
nascent trolls.1 61
apportionment argued that a ruling in favor of Apple on the total
profits issue would send an irresistible signal to would-be design
patent trolls. 162 Opponents responded that design patent trolling had
158.
1992).

Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 824 n.17 (Fed. Cir.

159.

See Du MONT & JANIS, Design Patent Remedies, supra note 4, at 41

(discussing remarks made during the House floor debate suggesting that the
disgorgement language was intended to be "preventive in its character").
160. Cf Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567, 583 (E.D. Pa.
2002) ("In the absence of clear guidelines for setting a statutory damage award [for
trademark counterfeiting], courts have tended to use their wide discretion to
compensate plaintiffs, as well as to deter and punish defendants.").
161. For a sampling of the literature on troll activity in copyright, analyzing
the role of statutory damages in the troll business model see Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, The Uneasy CaseAgainst Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REv. 723, 778
(2013) (suggesting, inter alia, that non-author plaintiffs be forbidden from electing
statutory damages unless they can prove compensable harm); James DeBriyn,
Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright Litigation in
the Age of StatutoryDamages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 79, 106 (2012) (asserting that
statutory damages should be eliminated as an anti-troll measure).
162. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Engine Advocacy and Shapeways, Inc.,
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,
Case No. 15-777 at 22-26 (Jun. 8, 2016).

272

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 37:3

not emerged as a real world problem' 63 despite the fact that the total
profits language had existed for over a century. " They reasoned that
design patent markets were unlikely to develop because design patent
owners were more likely to hold and maintain design patents than they
would trademarks. 165 Opponents also argued that while patent trolls
might become proficient in anticipating technological trends and
accumulating relevant utility patents, it would be far more difficult to
predict systematically new design trends and secure a corresponding
design patent position.1 66 This last argument depends upon another
contestable question that may be difficult to generalize: whether
design patents afford a broad scope of protection extending well
beyond the disclosed design, or whether the combination of disclosure
and infringement rules confines the scope67of most design patents to
1
close simulations of the disclosed design.'
Troll debates are difficult enough to pierce in utility patent law,
where empirical studies and policy papers abound, but in design patent
law, they are disputes that cannot be resolved based on current
information. There are no empirical studies of troll behavior in the
design patent space, and there is but a comparatively limited
understanding of how design patent litigants use the litigation process.
At a minimum, these concerns point out the need for
safeguards that operate at various levels of the statutory damages
analysis: those that guide the determination of statutory damages
within the prescribed statutory range, those that impose threshold
requirements that may restrict the availability of statutory damages to
only a subset of cases, and those that establish affirmative limitations
or safe harbors for certain classes of infringers or infringing activities.
These ideas are developed further in the following subsections.

163.

See, e.g., Brief for the Boston Patent Law Association as Amicus Curiae

in Support of Respondent, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., Case No. 15-777
at 9-11 (Aug. 5, 2016) [hereinafter BPLA Brief].
164. Whether Section 289's existence was widely appreciated, and whether it
was widely understood that Section 289's total profits language foreclosed
apportionment, are debatable points.
165. BPLA Brief, supra note 163 at 9-11.
166. Brief for Respondent at 59, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137
S. Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777) (July 29, 2016).
167. See Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, DisclosingDesigns, 69 VAND. L.
REv. 1631 (2016) (discussing the influence of the disclosure rules); see infra III.B.3
(discussing how the infringement standard might interact with a notion of design
patent counterfeiting).
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Rough Nexus with Actual Damages

A statutory damages regime for design patents should include
a mechanism for guiding the assessment of statutory damages within
the prescribed range. Ideally, that mechanism would assist in keeping

the statutory damages analysis linked to its predominantly
compensatory aspirations, taking lessons from the experience of
copyright law, where the problem of excessive damages awards is
well-documented. 168 It might also help to make statutory damages
assessments more transparent.
In copyright and trademark cases, some courts have laid out
factor tests intended to guide the statutory damages decision. For
example, one test recommends accounting for: "'(1) the expenses
saved and the profits reaped;' '(2) the revenues lost by the plaintiff;'
'(3) the value of the copyright;' '(4) the deterrent effect on others
besides the defendant;' '(5) whether the defendant's conduct was
innocent or willful;' '(6) whether a defendant has cooperated in
providing particular records from which to assess the value of the
infringing material produced;' and '(7) the potential for discouraging
the defendant."'' 169 Other courts have relied on similar, case-specific
considerations, 170 along with surveying other statutory damages
awards. 171

168.

See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in

Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need ofReform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009).
169. Gucci America, Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 315 F. Supp. 2d 511, 520
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Fitzgerald Pub. Co., Inc. v. Baylor Pub. Co., 807 F.2d 1110,
1117 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying the factors to copyright statutory damages)); see also
Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 168, at 501-08 (supplying an extensive list of
"do's and don'ts" for courts confronting statutory damages issues in copyright
cases).

170. See Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Ultimate One Dist. Corp., 176 F. Supp.
3d 137, 169 (E.D. N.Y. 2016) (taking into account the "sheer size and scope" of the
defendants' unauthorized activities, the "value of plaintiffs' trademarks," and the
defendants' "reckless disregard for public health and safety" in bottling the
counterfeited product in unregulated conditions); Coach, Inc. v. Fashion Paradise,
LLC, 2012 WL 194092, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2012) (accounting for the monetary
value of the counterfeit good and the fact that sales were conducted online, thus
affording the counterfeiter wide market exposure).
171. See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts, 2010 WL 2521444, at *6
(D.N.J. May 15, 2014).
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As Samuelson and her co-authors 172 point out, a number of
countries whose copyright laws include statutory damages provisions
have incorporated explicit lists of factors into their statutes to guide
the statutory damages determination. Israel's statute, for example,
includes as a factor "the actual injury" to the copyright owner,17 3 an
express reminder of the need for proportionality even if actual
damages cannot be calculated with precision. Other lists call for
assessments of the defendant's good (or bad) faith, and, in the
Canadian statute, call for prescribed equitable considerations to be
taken into account in cases where the infringements are for non74
commercial purposes. 1
There is some indication from trademark counterfeiting cases
that factor tests such as these can sensitize decision-makers to the
dangers of windfall in statutory damages assessments. 175 But there are
troubling contrary indications, as well, serving as a reminder that
factor tests, even when expressly codified, are likely to take us only
176
partway in calibrating a statutory damages analysis.
Moreover, although the law is not clear, it should be assumed
for discussion purposes that statutory damages for design patent
infringement would be determined by a jury. In copyright law, there
is a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on all issues concerning
177
statutory damages, including the determination of the amount.
There is at least some indication that this rule also extends to
trademark statutory damages' 7 8 As for design patent law, the 1887
Act establishing the special remedies provision for design patents
172. Pamela Samuelson, Phil Hill & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages: A
Rarity in Copyright Laws Internationally,But for How Long?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 529 (2013).
173. Id. at 554.
174. See id; see also infra Part II.B.4 (discussing safeguards for innocent
infringers).
175. See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Treasure Box, Inc., 2014 WL 888902 (N.D. Ind.
Mar. 6, 2014) (awarding $45,000 in a trademark counterfeiting case and declining
the trademark owner's request for $1.5 million).
176. See Samuelson et al., supra note 168, at 553 (pointing out a tendency for
factors to be "merely listed by rote," unaccompanied by any analysis that links
factors to particular facts in the case).
177. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353
(1998). But see BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 891-92 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding no Seventh Amendment jury trial right where copyright owner requests only
the minimum amount of statutory damages and the court concluded that there were
no other material facts in dispute regarding statutory damages).
178. See Microsoft Corp. v. Ion Techs. Corp., 2003 WL 21356084, *6 (D.
Minn. May 30, 2003) (extending Feltnerto trademark statutory damages claims).
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made explicit that a claim for special remedies could be asserted either
in an action at law or a bill brought in equity, which may suggest that
Congress saw statutory damages as a form of relief that might be left
179
to the jury, more akin to actual damages than to punitive damages.
And the Federal Circuit has held that a Section 289 award is a type of
"damages" to which marking provision applies. 180 Thus, the factors
analysis might come into play primarily in the form of instructions to
the jury, and one may wonder about the degree of influence that the
factors are likely to supply in that role.
A statutory damages provision for design patent infringement
should also clarify that the award should be a single amount per patent,
regardless of the number of articles bearing infringing designs. This
is (probably) the existing law under Section 182
289,181 and reflects
current thinking in copyright and trademark law.
It is reasonable to ask why limitations such as factor tests
would suffice to guard against excessive damages awards in design
patent cases, especially since these tests are borrowed from copyright
law, where complaints about excessive damages are prominent in the
scholarly discourse. But the model of copyright litigation that
generated the awards in question may not translate directly to design
patents. Consider the prototypical illegal downloading case, arising
when an individual illegally downloads hundreds or thousands of
179. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001)
(explaining that actual damages determination is generally a fact question for the
jury, while punitive damages award is not).
180. Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
181. See Young v. Grand Rapids Refrig. Co., 268 F. 966, 974 (6th Cir. 1920)
("[W]e think it could not have been the intention of Congress, without more explicit
language, to impose [the statutory] penalty for each article; indeed, the statute refers
to profits of more than $250 from the sale of the 'article or articles,' as though it was
immaterial whether singular or plural."). Early British design law was ambiguous
on this point. See Patents, Designs, & Trade Marks Act, 46 & 47 Vict., cmt. 57, §
58 (Eng.) (1883) (providing that "a sum not exceeding fifty pounds" could be
awarded "for every offence" for infringing a protected design right); An Act to
Consolidate & Amend the Laws Relating to the Copyright of Designs for
Ornamenting Articles of Manufacture, 5 &6 Vict., cmt. 100 , VIII (Eng.) (1842)
(providing that an award of "a sum not less than five pounds and not exceeding thirty
pounds" could be made "for every offence").
182. See, e.g., Gabbanelli Accordions & Imports, L.L.C. v. Gabbanelli, 575
F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2009) (ruling that the statutory damages in trademark
counterfeiting cases, which measures statutory damages per counterfeit mark per
"type of goods" sold, does not authorize an award for each individual item bearing
the counterfeit mark); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (calling for the award of a single set of
statutory damages "for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any
one work").
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different copyrighted works owned by the holder of a large copyright
portfolio, and the portfolio holder sues in a single lawsuit for statutory
damages for each of the infringed works. It seems unlikely that
ordinary design patent infringement matters would fit that pattern.
Two caveats should be considered. First, it is conceivable that
any given product might infringe multiple design patents, leading to
some multiplication of statutory damages. But it would be surprising
if a product were to infringe on hundreds or thousands of design
patents. Second, the rise of 3D printing services may create some
challenges that could present the risk of arguably excessive damages
awards. One can imagine an operator of 3D printing services
infringing (directly or indirectly) on massive numbers of design
patents, and thus facing exposure to statutory damages multiplied by
a massive multiplier.
At bottom, a new statutory damages provision for design
patent infringement should incorporate a factor test prescribing
sensible guidelines for assessing statutory damages. A new statutory
damages provision would be better off with it than without it, even if
its impact is only modest.
3.

Should Statutory Damages be Available only
for Design Patent "Counterfeiting"?

As noted, statutory damages under the trademark law model
are available only in cases of trademark "counterfeiting," and access
to the higher range of statutory damages is further limited to cases in
which the counterfeiting is "willful." The statutory damages provision
also reaches only the "sale, offering for sale, or distribution" of goods
or services bearing a counterfeit mark, suggesting the mere possession
1 83
of such goods does not give rise to liability for counterfeiting.
The statute defines the concept of a counterfeit mark, albeit
loosely, while it leaves willfulness undefined. In particular, the
Lanham Act defines a "counterfeit" as "a spurious mark which is
identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered
mark."' 184 One of the civil counterfeiting remedies provisions,
Lanham Act § 34(b), adds further restrictions, defining "counterfeit
mark" for purposes of the remedies provisions as "a counterfeit of a
mark" that is registered on the Principal Register for goods or services

183.
184.

15 U.S.C. § 1117(c).
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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identical to those of the counterfeiter, and that is also in use.1 85 In
theory, the "identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from"
formulation requires a heightened showing that exceeds the showing
required by the likelihood-of-confusion test. Indeed, there are cases
in which courts have found that the defendant's activities give rise to
a likelihood of confusion but do not constitute counterfeiting,
including at least one trade dress case.' 86 On the other hand, some
courts seem to resort to a know-it-when-I-see-it analysis for
counterfeiting and presume confusion without engaging in any multifactor likelihood-of-confusion test. 187 The risk, however, is that courts
might apply a less rigorous standard for counterfeiting even while
insisting that it is more rigorous. Moreover, one may wonder whether
there are reliable ways to distinguish between non-willful and willful
counterfeiting. The very notion of counterfeiting might produce an
irresistible inference of willfulness,1 88 tugging courts towards the
corresponding statutory damages track. And some courts have shown
a willingness to infer willfulness from a defendant's decision to
default. 189
The trademark provisions, though imperfect, may provide
some insights worth considering for design patent law. In particular,
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B). This Section also specifies that whether the
person against whom relief is sought knew of the registration is not relevant. Id. The
identical goods/services requirement is more clearly stated in the legislative history
than in the text of the statute. See Senate-House Joint Explanatory Statement on
Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 Cong. Rec. H12076, at 12078-79 (Oct.
10, 1984) ("[B]ecause this act is intended to reach only the most egregious forms of
trademark infringement, it does not affect cases in which the defendant uses a
registered mark in connection with goods or services for which the mark is not
registered."); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR

§ 25:15 n.7 (2017).
186. Audemars Piguet Holding S.A. v. Swiss Watch Int'l, Inc., 2015 WL
150756, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2015) (pointing out visual differences in the shapes
and positions of the screw heads on the bezels of the accused watch trade dress as
compared to the registered trade dress); see also Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d
295, 315 (2d Cir. 2013) (pointing out differences in the "font, color, and
capitalization" of the marks at issue).
187. See, e.g., Chanel, Inc. v. Veronique Idea Corp., 795 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[T]he Court need not undertake a step-by-step analysis
under Polaroidbecause counterfeits, by their very nature, cause confusion.");
Yurman Studio, Inc. v. Castaneda, 591 F. Supp. 2d 471, 498 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (finding the likelihood-of-confusion factor test unnecessary where the
defendant's mark is a counterfeit).
188. It would be illuminating to test this point empirically.
189. See, e.g., Rovio Ent., Ltd. v. Allstar Vending, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 536
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
COMPETITION
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a statutory damages provision could be confined to cases of design
patent counterfeiting-a new concept that would require definition. In
trademarks, the concept of a counterfeit mark is defined using the
infringement liability standard (likelihood of confusion) as a frame of
reference: a counterfeit is something more than just confusingly
similar.
Similarly, a standard of comparison that is more exacting than
the conventional infringement standard could be used to inform the
definition of design patent counterfeiting. According to the traditional
standard, a design patent is infringed when "in the eye of an ordinary
observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two
designs are substantially the same," meaning that "the resemblance is
such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one
supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the
other." 190 This standard deliberately rejects the perspective of the
expert observer and adopts that of the less-refined "ordinary"
observer.1 91 Under the modem infringement analysis, additional steps
may be required. If the defendant has proffered prior art, the
infringement analysis must also include a comparison of the asserted
design against the prior art, an exercise that could either magnify the
deceptive similarity between the patented and accused designs (if
those design share features that are conspicuously absent from the
prior art) or reduce it (if the alleged similarity derives mainly from
192
features also common to the prior art).
Access to statutory damages in the design patent area could be
limited to cases in which the patented and accused designs are
substantially indistinguishable when viewed by a designer of ordinary
skill in the art. The ordinary designer perspective would send a strong
signal to the design patent community that particularly exacting
scrutiny is expected, even if the "substantially indistinguishable"
formulation proves to be less than ironclad.
The concept of design patent counterfeiting could also
incorporate the requirement that the article of manufacture associated
with the patented and accused designs must be identical, echoing the
requirement from trademark law. Such a requirement would have
interesting implications for the practice of partial claiming. Indeed, a
provision could require design patent owners to forgo partial claiming
190. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871).
191. See Du MONT & JANIS, Design Patent Remedies, supra note 4, at ch. 5
(analyzing the Gorham decision).
192. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc).
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in a given design patent in order to have access to the statutory
193
damages remedy.
Design patent counterfeiting, as I have formulated it, is not
formally limited to cases of willful copying. 194 The idea here is to
eliminate the gravitational pull that might be exerted if there existed a
second, heightened statutory damages range for willful counterfeiting.
Evidence of willfulness would be relevant to guide an award within
the statutory range, 195 but would not be used as a justification for
creating a separate statutory damages track.
4.

Safeguards for Innocent Infringers

Analogies to the statutory damages approach in trademark and
copyright law may be weakest when we turn to the issue of how to
insulate innocent infringers from threats of large statutory damages
awards for design patent infringement. As noted above, design patent
law may provide a more robust set of exclusive rights than trademark
and copyright do. Further, reasonable minds can differ on whether that
makes it more likely for design patents to ensnare innocent infringers
from infringement claims. Moreover, design patent law, borrowing
from utility patent law, includes little in the way of limitations and
patent law
exceptions on those exclusive rights. For example, design
196
provision.
use
fair
copyright's
to
includes no analog

193. In the context of design patents for graphical user interface designs, where
partial claiming is commonplace, this requirement might prevent the holder of a
design patent on an icon design used on a mobile phone from asserting that the use
of the design on a t-shirt constituted design patent counterfeiting. For a reference to
this example under current design patent infringement law, see Du Mont & Janis,
Virtual Designs, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. at 171-73.
194. Patent infringement is, of course, a matter of strict liability, 35 U.S.C. §
271 (a), and there is empirical evidence that despite perceptions to the contrary, most
utility patent cases do not involve evidence of copying. Christopher A. Cotropia &
Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C.L. REV. 1421 (2009) (studying
200 patent cases filed between January 1, 2000 and May 1, 2007, from two districts).
No comparable empirical study of which I am aware assesses whether design patent
infringement cases regularly involve evidence of copying.
195. Alternatively, design patent owners who believe that they can establish
actual damage under Section 284 could also seek a willfulness determination and
argue that the actual damages should be trebled under the discretionary authority
that Section 284 provides.
196. Maureen O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (arguing that patent law should adopt such a
provision).
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For purposes of crafting a statutory damages provision for
design patent infringement, this suggests that it is imperative that such
a provision include a well-crafted safe harbor provision for innocent
infringers. Indeed, that is likely to be a discussion worth having in
design patent law even outside the scope of an exploration into
statutory damages.
Existing trademark and copyright approaches to this issue
provide some foundational ideas but are not protective enough to be
lifted directly into design patent law. For example, the copyright law
includes a remittitur provision applicable in cases "where the infringer
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer
was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts
constituted an infringement of copyright.' ' 1 97 In such cases, the court
is authorized "in its discretion" to reduce the statutory damages award
to as low as $200. 198 The provision also mandates remittitur of any
statutory damages in specified activities undertaken by librarians and
public broadcasters who "believed[,] and had reasonable grounds for
believing[,] that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair
9
, 19

use."

The problem with the discretionary remittitur provision lies in
its interaction with the post-Berne era copyright notice rules. Those
rules make copyright notice permissive, but also specify that where
the copyright owner has affixed a proper notice to published copies
(or phonorecords) of the work to which the defendant had access, "no
weight" may be given to the defendant's defense of innocent
infringement "in mitigation of actual or statutory damages." 200 Thus,
"even an innocent defendant generally cannot remit statutory damages
below the mandatory minimum, unless the subject work was
unpublished, bore an invalid notice, or was inaccessible to the
defendant."
As for trademark law, Congress declined to include an express
safe harbor provision in the anti-counterfeiting legislation. Instead,
the safe harbor, such as it is, is buried in an "explanatory statement"
197. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
198. Id.; see also NFL v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 131 F. Supp. 2d 458,
467-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (exercising discretion to decline to remit statutory
damages).
199. Id.
200. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d), 402(d). These rules only cut off discretionary
remittitur; they carve out exceptions to preserve mandatory remittitur for prescribed
librarian/public broadcaster fair uses. Id.
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in the legislative history. According to the statement, a party who, in
good faith, notifies the trademark owner thirty days in advance, and
labels its goods to disclaim an affiliation with the mark owner, should
not be deemed to have knowledge that it is using a counterfeit mark.2 °1
This exceptionally impractical provision calls for specialized
knowledge of the law that few other than the most seasoned trademark
practitioners would possess. Even more troubling, it seems the
provision is designed only to negate the infringer's knowledge, which
is not a requirement in any event for the award of statutory damages
20 2
for non-willful counterfeiting.
Under trademark law, the statutory damages provision limits
damages "as the court considers just" in connection with statutory
20 3
damages ranges for both non-willful and willful counterfeiting.
Perhaps this is shorthand for the discretionary authority that the main
damages provision provides in ordinary cases: "If the court shall find
that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate
or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such
sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances
of the case." 20 4 Such language might provide some purchase for an
innocent infringer to argue mitigation of statutory damages, but it is
hardly adequate to signal an intent to insulate good faith actors from
exposure to potentially large statutory damages awards.20 5
In developing an appropriate safe harbor provision for design
patent law, history offers some useful lessons. The original proposal
for a special damages provision for design patents clearly
distinguished between infringing manufacturers and infringing
retailers, permitting special damages to be levied against
manufacturers in all cases, but permitting them against retailers only
upon a showing that the retailer had knowledge that the design had
been applied to an article of manufacture without the patent owner's

201. Senate-House Joint Explanatory Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting
Legislation, 130 Cong. Rec. H12076, at 12077 (Oct. 10, 1984).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1).
203. 15 U.S.C. §§ 11 17(c)(1)-(2). The copyright statutory damages provision
also includes this language for statutory damages awarded in cases of non-willful
infringement;17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). This provision specifies that "[s]uch sum in either of
the above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty."
205. Moreover, the "as the court considers just" clause may also be in tension
with the proposition that statutory damages are to be set by the jury.
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authorization. 20 6 That distinction was retained in the special remedies
provision as enacted in 1887.207
The knowledge requirement generated confusion, in part
because the statute did not specify how the requirement meshed with
the patent marking provision,20 8 a striking parallel with the modem
remittitur provision in copyright law. In an otherwise confused
opinion, the Supreme Court in Dunlap v. Schofield °9 ruled that the
$250 remedy under the 1887 Act design patent remedies provision
constituted an award of "damages" and hence might be denied if a
design patentee had failed to mark.21 0 In addition, the Court appeared
to assume that the showing of knowledge required under the special
damages provision could not be met merely by showing that the
infringer was on constructive notice due to compliance with the
marking provision. Rather, the alleged infringer needed to have both
"knowledge of the patent and of his infringement." 211 Nevertheless,
when Congress recodified the patent law in 1952, it deleted the
knowledge limitation for retailers, and that requirement has never
reappeared.21 2 Perhaps Congress considered the marking provision
sufficient to establish the requisite notice notwithstanding the contrary
sentiments express in Dunlap. All that the legislative history appears
to reveal is that Congress thought that it was making no substantive
change to the special remedies provision.21 3

206.

See Du MONT & JANIS, Design Patent Remedies, supra note 4, at 58

(reproducing the language of H.R. 5570 and S.1034).
207. See id. at 59 (reproducing the language of S.1813, enacted in 1887-the
predecessor to modem Section 289). But cf Nike v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d
1437, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (appearing to assume that the knowledge requirement
in the 1887 legislation applied both to manufacturers and to retailers).
208. 1870 Act at § 38 (REv. STAT. § 4900) (precluding the patentee from
collecting "damages" if the patentee failed to mark, presumably meaning damages
that accrued before the patentee provided the infringer with actual notice through
some means).
209. 152 U.S. 244 (1894).
210. Id.at 248.
211. Id.; see also Gimbel v.Hogg, 97 F.791, 794 (3d Cir. 1899) (explaining
that constructive notice provided by compliance with marking statute isnot
sufficient to supply actual knowledge to resellers as required under 1887 Act).
212. See 35 U.S.C. § 289 (omitting any knowledge requirement).
213. Patent Law Codification & Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary,82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 109-10 (1951)
(statement of P. J. Federico, U.S. Patent Office) (stating that "the present code
merely puts [the subject of design patents] in its place without attempting to make
any changes in the statute").
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The modem design patent law can learn from these missteps.
First, as part of the exercise of establishing a safe harbor against
statutory damages claims, Congress could restore the requirement that
infringing retailers be shown to have, at a minimum, knowledge of the
patent and of the infringement.214 Or, Congress could set a higher
threshold by requiring a showing that the infringing retailers acted
intentionally. 215 Such a provision might also specify that to the extent
that mere use of an article bearing an infringing design constitutes
design patent infringement, the infringing user could only be subject
to statutory damages upon a showing of knowledge or intent.
Second, the safe harbor provision should also clarify the
relationship with the patent marking provision. Specifically, it should
make clear that constructive notice in the form of a design patent
marking alone is not sufficient to establish knowledge or intent.216
5.

Fee-Shifting

To the extent that new statutory damages legislation for design
patents draws by analogy to trademark anti-counterfeiting provisions,
the issue of fee-shifting warrants attention. Under the trademark
provisions, where a trademark owner elects actual damages in a
counterfeiting action, the mark owner is entitled to recover their
attorney's fees (assuming that they satisfy the elements in Lanham Act
§ 35(b) for intentional use of a counterfeit mark triggering mandatory
treble damages). 217 However, the statute is silent about whether the
mandatory fee-shifting provision should also apply when the mark

214.

The Court's decisions on inducement of infringement in the utility patent

context provide an understanding of the requisites of knowledge. Commil USA,
LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (good faith belief in invalidity alone
does not suffice to negate knowledge of the existence of the infringement); GlobalTech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) (evidence of willful

blindness may demonstrate knowledge of the existence of the patent).
215.

Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-33 (2016)

(rejecting objective recklessness as a requirement for showing willfulness, and
defining willfulness as egregious misconduct and the like).
216. See also Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that
mere knowledge of a utility patent, without more, should not give rise to a finding

of willfulness).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (recovery of a "reasonable attorney's fee").
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owner elects statutory damages, and a circuit split on the point has
developed.2 18 Design patent law should head off this problem by
specifying that fee-shifting in design patent statutory damages cases
under the exceptionality standard applicable to
should be adjudicated
21 9
cases.
all patent
CONCLUSION

Is a statutory damages remedy for design patent infringement
worth exploring? The experience of contemporary copyright law with
the statutory damages regime is sobering, and for the reasons
discussed in this paper, I do not advocate importing the copyright
model of statutory damages into design patent law. The more
constrained approach to statutory damages exemplified by the
trademark anti-counterfeiting provisions provides a baseline for
discussions about the contours of a statutory damage remedy for
design patent law. However, the existing trademark rules would also
need some significant modifications, including, among others, the
creation of a meaningful safe harbor provision for innocent infringers.
The intuitive appeal of a statutory damage provision for design
patent infringement is that, in theory, it ought to entail much lower
administrative costs than either a post-Samsung disgorgement of
profits analysis or a Section 284 utility patent damages analysis
extended to design patents. In theory, it also should be more
predictable. Whether any of this would hold in practice is a close
question. A statutory damages provision, as I have envisioned it,
would incorporate elements that might add complexity and
administrative cost-imperatives, I have argued, in order to strike a
balance that achieves the provision's compensatory and deterrence
objectives without throwing open the door to abuses and windfalls.
Practice under such a provision might be an improvement over
existing Section 284 and 289 alternatives, and so the discussion is
worth pursuing. If there appears to be no real prospect for crafting an
acceptable statutory damages provision for design patents, this is
218. K & N Eng'g, Inc. v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding
mandatory attorney fees under Lanham Act § 35(b) unavailable if the mark owner
elects to receive statutory damages under Lanham Act 35(c)). But cf Louis Vuitton
Malletier, S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 110 (2d Cir. 2012) (disagreeing with
K & NEng'g and finding mandatory attorney fees available).
219. 35 U.S.C. § 285; Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1744 (2014).
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useful knowledge indicating that more creative adjustments need to be
explored for adapting Section 284 remedies for design patents.

